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Minimum parking requirements are the norm for urban and suburban development in the United States
(Davidson and Dolnick (2002)). The justification for parking space requirements is that overflow parking
will occupy nearby street or off-street parking. Shoup (1999) and Willson (1995) provides cases where
there is reason to believe that parking space requirements have forced parcel developers to place more
parking than they would in the absence of parking requirements. If the effect of parking minimums is to
significantly increase the land area devoted to parking, then the increase in impervious surfaces would
likely cause water quality degradation, increased flooding, and decreased groundwater recharge. However,
to our knowledge the existing literature does not test the effect of parking minimums on the amount of lot
space devoted to parking beyond a few case studies. This paper tests the hypothesis that parking space
requirements cause an oversupply of parking by examining the implicit marginal value of land allocated to
parking spaces. This is an indirect test of the effects of parking requirements that is similar to Glaeser and
Gyourko (2003). A simple theoretical model shows that the marginal value of additional parking to the sale
price should be equal to the cost of land plus the cost of parking construction. We estimate the marginal
values of parking and lot area with spatial methods using a large data set from the Los Angeles area non-
residential property sales and find that for most of the property types the marginal value of parking is
significantly below that of the parcel area. This evidence supports the contention that minimum parking
requirements significantly increase the amount of parcel area devoted to parking.
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21. Introduction
Most cities in the US have parking standards which require developers to provide a minimum
amount of off-street parking per square foot of floor space.4 These minimum parking
requirements are usually set by city planners from standardized transportation planning manuals,
which typically measure parking and trip generation rates at peak periods with ample free parking
and no public transit. The goal of Minimum Parking Requirements (MPRs) is to ensure adequate
parking at a low price in order to limit local congestion and to stimulate local business (Shoup
(1999)).
Minimum parking requirements have been criticized due to their land and transportation
market distortions. Opponents of MPRs (Shoup (1999, 2005), Willson (1995)) argue that these
parking standards create an oversupply of parking in most urban areas which decreases the cost
(direct and time) of parking and therefore encourages more automobile trips (Shoup (1999, 2005),
Shoup and Pickrell (1978)). In addition, critics allege that minimum parking requirements force
developers to use more land space per square foot of building construction and make
development in areas where land has a high value much more expensive and less profitable
(Willson (1995)). As a result, minimum parking requirements influence the location of new
development, make infill projects and historic building retrofits less attractive and feasible
(Shoup and Pickrell (1978)) and contribute to the sprawling of impervious parking surface at the
expense of the environment (Feitelson and Rotem (2004)) and urban design (Mukhija and Shoup
(2006)). However, the previous debate does not consider other factors that may interact with
MPRs such as Floor-Area-Ratio (FAR) restrictions.
The purposes of this paper are twofold. First, we develop an analytical model of building
construction that includes MPRs, FAR restrictions and endogenous decision-making over surface
versus below-ground parking. This theoretical model allows us to formally examine the impacts
of minimum parking requirements on development density, parking external costs and amount of
parking supplied, adding to a small analytical literature on this regulation. And second, we test
the hypothesis that parking requirements cause an oversupply of parking using data on
commercial and industrial, and retail property sales from Los Angeles County.
Even though parking requirements are intensely debated in urban and transport planning
arenas, little effort has been devoted to the theoretical analysis of this instrument. The only
analytical studies are by Shoup and Pickrell (1978) and Feitelson and Rotem (2004). Both studies
4 For example, the zoning ordinance for Wilshire Boulevard in Los Angeles requires three parking spaces
per 1,000 square feet of gross floor area for office buildings and other commercial uses (Shoup (2002)).
3use graphical analysis to discuss the impacts of minimum parking requirements on parking price
and quantity. Shoup and Pickrell (1978) focus their graphical discussion on how minimum
parking requirements may affect the development of parking submarkets. They argue that if
parking requirements are uniform throughout a jurisdiction while demand and supply vary by
location, the requirements may force an increase in the total amount of parking provided but also
an inefficient allocation of parking across space. Feitelson and Rotem (2004) focus their graphical
discussion on the external costs of surface parking. The authors argue that even without minimum
parking requirements, developers will oversupply parking because of the direct environmental
negative externalities and the indirect sprawl-inducement externalities.
One of the advantages of constructing a theoretical model that captures the essence of the
problems associated with minimum parking requirements is that such a model can develop and
support hypothesis that we can test empirically. Moreover, it also may provide useful insights
beyond those provided by earlier papers. For example, parking requirements can influence
building density, but may not always be the largest barrier to density. Zoning conditions, in
particular FAR restrictions may be a larger barrier in certain cases.
Thus, in contrast to Shoup and Pickrell (1978) and Feitelson and Rotem (2004), we develop a
theoretical framework where we model separately the behavior of city center developers and
suburban developers and where parking and floor space are bundled and rented as a package to
tenants of a building. Both types of developers maximize profits. We extend previous analyses
by considering two types of parking structures: underground parking or surface parking. 5 In our
model surface parking also generates negative external costs.6 Another feature of our model is the
presence of a floor-to-area (FAR) restriction. Within this model we examine not only the impact
of MPRs on total parking supplied but also on the supply of different types of parking (surface
and underground), building square footage and level of parking externality.
Our analytical results show that surface parking is more efficient if the price of land is
relatively low. For a sufficiently high price of land, the developer provides underground parking
instead of surface parking. Because parking space is capitalized into rents, this will encourage
developers to voluntarily supply parking space whenever the resulting revenue will cover its
costs, even in the absence of parking requirements. Because developers do not take into account
5 We realize that there are also above-ground structure parking that is an intermediate choice between
underground and surface parking, but we believe that the underground and surface parking captures the
essential elements of the developer’s parking choice problem.
6 The imperviousness of surface parking areas leads to water pollution, storm water flooding and reduces
the amount of open space available for recreation and for ecosystem services. Surface parking lots are also
often unsightly and thus have deleterious visual effects. Finally, such areas contribute to the formation of
the urban heat island, as they are likely to affect temperatures in their immediate vicinity.
4parking external costs, developers will oversupply parking in an unregulated market. The main
effects of MPRs are that parking spaces will be priced below the cost of providing them and the
external costs associated with surface parking will be exacerbated because MPRs exacerbate the
market oversupply of parking. In addition, MPRs constitute an indirect tax on building square
footage which creates a disincentive to high-density development. In particular, minimum
parking requirements may drive the total square footage allowed and potentially inhibit density
below what a FAR limit permits. 7 However, in areas with stringent limits on building height and
where parking can feasibly be provided, our analytic results suggest that FAR limits may be a
more important constraint on densities.
Parking lots occupy a significant proportion of the built cover in many urban and suburban
areas. Ferguson (2005) estimates that in multi-family areas parking lots comprise about 30% of
the built cover and in commercial areas parking lots comprise about 60% of the built cover.
Increases in impermeable surfaces such as parking have important environmental consequences
because impermeable surfaces are thought to cause a variety of environmental, mainly water-
related externalities (Arnold and Gibbons (1996)). If the effect of parking minimums is to
significantly increase the land area devoted to parking, the increase in impervious surfaces would
likely cause water quality degradation, increased flooding, and decreased groundwater recharge.8
Thus, knowledge of whether or not MPRs are binding is important information.
Shoup (1999) and Willson (1995) provide cases where there is reason to believe that parking
requirements have forced developers to place more parking than they would in the absence of this
regulation. However, we are not aware of any broad based empirical evidence that tests whether it
appears that developers are placing significantly more parking on their land than they would in
the absence of parking requirements. In addition, to our knowledge there is also no study that
examines which land use categories are most affected by minimum parking requirements.
In this paper we test the hypothesis that parking space requirements cause an oversupply of
parking using both direct and indirect approaches. Our direct test compares actual versus required
parking for a subsample of our data where we are able to approximate MPRs for the property.
7 This could occur whenever the amount of parking is constrained for example due to site geometry (size
and shape) and/or inconvenient site topography (slopes and poor soil conditions) which substantially
increase parking costs.
8 Impervious surfaces decrease infiltration of rainfall into the soil and increase the volume and speed of
surface runoff (Arnold and Gibbons (1996)). Increased impervious coverage leads to less groundwater
recharge, increased erosion, destruction of stream habitat, and increased transport of pollutants. Impervious
surfaces also quickly transport pollutants such as trash, toxics, and nutrients to water bodies (Arnold and
Gibbons (1996)). Impervious surfaces therefore are a significant cause of the non-point source water
pollution that the Environmental Protection Agency (1994) now believes is the largest remaining source of
water quality problems.
5Our indirect approach uses the gap between the marginal parking space costs and the marginal
value of an additional parking space to the sale price to measure the extent of oversupply of
parking. Based on our analytical results, this gap should be zero whenever MPRs are not binding.
Therefore, if MPRs bind this wedge should be positive. Our indirect test is thus very similar to
Glaeser and Gyourko (2002) who use the gap between real estate prices and the costs of
producing a marginal apartment to measure the distortions in the housing market caused by
zoning restrictions on new construction.9
We estimate the marginal values of parking and lot area with spatial and non-spatial methods
from Los Angeles area non-residential property sales. The data encompass a wide variety of
industrial, service shopping and general retail properties, and office properties from 1997-2005.
We use a spatial hedonic approach that includes property and locational characteristics and
various controls for spatial dependence.
Significant work has been done using hedonic methods to examine how various attributes
affect the sale price of non-residential parcels. Most of this work relates to the determinants of
commercial property sale indices.10 This literature considers a variety of locational,
neighborhood, building and parcel characteristics, but we are only aware of one previous study
that considers the amount of parking on the property Cutter et al. (forthcoming). In addition,
other work attempts to value environmental disamenities by examining whether property prices
change in response to the listing or de-listing of hazardous waste sites near a property (Ihlanfeldt
et al. (2004)). We use a hedonic approach where parking area, a characteristic that has only been
included in Cutter et al. (forthcoming), is one of the characteristics of the property.
Our empirical results find that the marginal value of parking on a lot appears to be
significantly less than the value of parcel area in several land-use categories in all specifications.
The difference between the marginal parking and property area values is significant and supports
9 The authors provide evidence that zoning is in fact constraining the supply of housing in a number of
housing markets across the United States.
10 Some examples are Hodgson (2006) and Colwell (1998). Other empirical studies have examined demand
side and supply side influences on office-commercial rents. Clapp (1980) tested the rent-accessibility trade-
off using 105 office buildings data in Los Angeles and found significant evidence to support the negative
rental function with respects to the distance from the CBD and the commuting time. His results also
supported the importance of face-to-face interaction in the CBD. Using a more recent set of office rental
data in Greater Los Angeles from the same source, Sivitanidou (1995) again found that the accessibility
factors (distance to CBD, distance to airport and number of interstate freeways) are significantly reflected
in variations of the office rental function. However, she found that the standard bid-rent function is
incomplete in explaining office bid-rent relationships unless other variables like worker amenities, zoning
and local institutional control are included in the model. Sivitanidou (1996) shows that office-commercial
firms value access to service centers within Los Angeles PMSA (Primary Metropolitan Statistical Area).
None of these previous studies examine how parking area influences office-commercial bid rent functions.
6the contention that minimum parking space requirements substantially increase the amount of
parcel area allocated to parking by developers. Our direct test of whether MPRs bind, which uses
a subsample of office properties, shows also that properties tend to have just the minimum
parking requirement or somewhat less parking than required.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 outlines the theoretical model and examines the
impacts of minimum parking requirements on the supply of surface parking, supply of
underground parking, building density and level of parking externalities. Section 3 develops the
empirical model. Section 4 describes our data and variables. Section 5 discusses our parking
regulation tests. Section 6 presents the empirical results and discusses their implications and
finally, Section 7 offers conclusions.
2. The Analytical Model
This section describes the features of the analytical model we will use to examine the impacts
of minimum parking requirements on structural density, amount of land developed and type of
parking supplied. We also provide and interpret key equations associated with the developers’
problem in the absence and presence of minimum parking requirements. Complete derivations are
provided in Appendix A.
2.1. Model Assumptions
Office-Commercial Rents
Suppose that the office-commercial-space bid rent in a given location is represented by:11
),( ANfB  (1)
where, B is the office-commercial rent per unit of floor space, N is total parking spaces and A
represents a vector of amenities associated with the location.12 Because we focus on a single
location the value of A is fixed. We assume that (1) is concave in its arguments.
11 The office-commercial bid rent represents the maximum willingness-to-pay by a firm for commercial-office space in
a building at particular location within the city. In this paper we focus on the behavior of developers and therefore, we
do not derive analytically equation (1). However, a demand model for office space, see for example Sivitanidou and
Wheaton (1992), would suggest that the quantity demanded is a function of rent, a firm’s output, and the amount of
office space it uses per worker. If the output market is competitive, in the long-run a firm’s profit is zero. From this
latter condition we can thus determine the equilibrium rent per unit of floor space (1). Moreover, for simplicity, we
assume that bid rents reflect prevailing market prices for office floor space, so that the two are synonymous. Thus, the
price of an office building would be the product of the bid-rent and total office floor space.
12 Building characteristics can influence the bid rent for office-commercial space at a particular location. Rents are
higher for buildings with greater total square footage, more floors and parking space. A higher total square footage may
be also indicative of building amenities (e.g. restaurants), face-to-face agglomeration economies or shopping
externalities. Office-commercial bid rents are also influenced by locational factors such access to the central business
7Parking space can take two forms: surface parking and underground parking. Surface parking
refers to lots directly on land and underground parking consists of structured parking under multi-
story buildings. 13 Both forms are assumed to be perfect substitutes from the tenants’ perspective
and therefore, total parking spaces are represented by:
us NNN  (2)
where sN is number of surface parking spaces and uN is number of underground parking
spaces.
Building Technology
Office-commercial floor space is produced according to a strictly concave, constant-returns
production function, ),( LKfH  , where K is capital used to produce floor space and L is the
amount of land physically covered by K (referred to subsequently as “covered land”). The
intensive form of this production function is written as )(Sh , where S is capital per unit of
covered land or structural density and h satisfies 0h and 0// h . )(Sh represents office-
commercial total floor space per unit of covered land. We assume that L is fixed.
Parking Costs
Parking costs differ depending on the type of parking facility provided. Construction costs
(excluding land) per space of surface parking are higher than the construction costs per space for
underground parking (Hunnicutt (1982)).14 However, surface parking precludes alternative uses
of land and hence its total costs are the sum of total construction costs and land costs ( )( ss NC ):
)()( lpKpNNC lksss  (3)
where lp and kp are the exogenous prices of land and capital, K is the fixed amount of
capital per surface parking space and l is the fixed amount of land per surface parking space.
district, access to surface and air transportation (freeways and major airports), access to good schools and level of
crime. For empirical evidence on the determinants of office-commercial bid rents see Sivitanidou (1995) and Bollinger
(1998).
13 Other types of parking facilities include on-street parking, off-street parking and structured parking in multistory
buildings. On-street parking consists of parking lanes provided within public road rights-of-way. Off-street parking are
parking facilities on their own land, not on road rights-of-way. Structured parking (also called parkades or ramps) are
parking facilities in or under multistory buildings. It is not uncommon to find structured parking in downtown areas
since land costs are very high. For simplicity we only analyze the cases of surface and underground parking (structured
parking under multi-story buildings). However, our results on underground parking can also be extended to other types
of structured parking.
14 Construction costs (excluding land) average about $1,600 per space for surface parking and $20,000 or more per
space for underground parking (Hunnicutt (1982)).
8We assume that no additional land is necessary for underground parking since it will be built
below the office-commercial building. Therefore, total costs for underground parking reflects
mainly its construction costs:
),(),( SNKpNSNC ukuuu  (4)
where )( uNK is the capital cost requirement per underground parking space and is assumed
to be a convex function with 0),(
2



SN
SNK
u
u . The reason is because as more underground parking
is added more units of capital are necessary to fortify the building structure and to provide
vertical-transportation requirements.
Surface Parking Externalities
Surface parking generates multiple environmental externalities. Let sL be the amount of
impervious land due to surface parking and )( sLE denote the external costs associated with
impervious surfaces. We assume that )( sLE is linear in the amount of land allocated to surface
parking:
ss eLLE )( (5)
where 0e is the unit of land external cost and lNL ss  .
Parking Requirements
The city government imposes a minimum parking requirement expressed as numbers of
parking spaces per square foot of gross building floor area:
)(SaLhN  (6)
where 10  a is a parameter imposed by the city government.15
Floor-Area-Ratio (FAR) restrictions
There is also an upper limit on the square footage of office-commercial space per unit of land
such that:
15 Note that H(K,L)=Lh(S). Since H(K,L) is concave and homogenous of degree 1we have that H(K/L,1)= h(S). Also,
the value of a can be lower, equal or higher than the value of a that would exist in an unconstrained market. However,
for the purpose of exploring the effects of minimum parking requirements we consider the case where a is such that
the constraint is always binding and thus, affects the market equilibrium. If for example, a =1/200sft, it means that
developers are required to provide one parking space for each 200sft of gross floor area.
9)ˆ(ˆ)( ShSh  (7)
where hˆ is the FAR limit per unit of land and Sˆ is the total structural density associated with
hˆ .
2.2 Type of parking provided
Differentiating (1) with respect to sN and uN , yields the same marginal benefit for both types
of parking spaces:
us N
N
N
ANB
N
N
N
ANB








 ),(),( (8)
As a result, the developer determines which type of parking space will be provided based on
the marginal cost. The private marginal cost per space of underground parking is given by:
u
u
ukk N
SNK
NpKp



),(
(9)
The first component of (9) is the marginal cost for the additional underground parking space,
which is the same for all parking spaces in the structure. The second component of (9) is the
inframarginal cost associated with the additional underground space. Note that the marginal cost
of underground parking increases with the height of the building because of the costs of providing
vertical transport and supporting a heavier building.
The private marginal cost per space of surface parking is given by:
lpKp lk  (10)
The first component of (10) is the marginal cost for the additional surface parking space and
the second component is the marginal cost of land. In contrast to (9), the marginal cost of surface
parking is constant and thus, it does not vary with the amount of parking space.
Comparing (9) and (10), the marginal cost of underground parking is greater than the
marginal cost of surface parking if the cost of land is small relative to the degree of diminishing
marginal returns:
lp
N
SNK
Np l
u
u
uk 

 ),(
(11)
Equation (11) suggests that surface parking is more efficient if the price of land is relatively
low.16 For a sufficiently high price of land, the developer provides underground parking instead
16 Structured parking typically becomes cost effective when land prices exceed about $1 million per acre.
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of surface parking.17 Given that land prices are typically very high in downtown areas, it is not
surprising that most parking bundled with office-commercial development in Central Business
Districts (CBD) is structured parking. In contrast, low-density office-commercial structures with
large surface parking lots such as shopping malls are mostly found in suburban areas where the
price of land is lower.
Next we specify the developer’s problem separately for the suburbs and the central city.
Given the preceding discussion, we assume that CBD developers provide underground parking
and suburban developers provide surface parking.
2.3. Central Business District (CBD)
The developer’s problem in the central city is to choose the level of structural density and
number of underground parking spaces that maximize his profits per unit of covered land taking
into account the FAR restriction and Minimum Parking Requirements (MPRs):18
)(
)ˆ()(..
),()(),(
,
SaLhN
ShShts
SNKNppSpShANBMax
u
uuklku
SNu



(12)
For the sake of expository convenience, we represent the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for an
interior solution for problem (12) in Table 1, where 1 is the shadow price associated with the
FAR constraint and 2 is the shadow price associated with the MPR constraint.
19 All the first-
order conditions are evaluated at the optimum levels. For full details see Appendix A.
17 If the marginal benefit of underground parking exceeds the marginal benefit of surface parking because
of differences in the costs and speeds of walking and elevator travel, then the developer may provide
underground parking even if the price of land is relatively low:
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
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


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



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If
su N
N
N
N




 is large enough to offset the diminishing marginal returns from underground parking, then
underground parking will be provided. Note also that a developer could choose a combination of surface
and underground parking spaces that minimizes total costs of providing parking spaces. However, in this
paper we focus only on boundary solutions and we assume that a developer can only provide underground or surface
parking spaces, but not both types.
18Equation (12) also implies that total floor space and parking space are “bundled” and rented as a package
to the tenants of a building. For example, in nearly all buildings in Los Angeles today, parking is included
in the price or rent of the unit. Tenants do not have the option of “unbundling” the cost of parking from
their purchase or rent. The main exception is in the Downtown area where some buildings do not include
parking in their rental rates.
19 This shadow price (the Lagrange multiplier) provides a measure of how a relaxation in the constraint will
affect the developer’s profit per unit of covered land. Thus, a high value of i indicates that the profit per
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There are three main conclusions that we can take upon examining table 1. First, because
parking is capitalized into office-commercial rents, this will encourage developers to voluntarily
supply parking whenever the resulting revenue will cover its costs, even in the absence of MPRs
(( 01  , 02  ) and ( 01  , 02  )). If the price of additional underground parking
( )(
),( *
*
Sh
N
ANB
u
u


) is at or above the marginal cost of providing it (
u
uu
N
SNC

 ),( **
), there is no
reason why developers would not provide it on their own in downtown areas ( 0* uN ). Thus,
even in the absence of MPRs, developers can offer a bundle of (parking spaces, floor space) as a
strategy to maximize profits. The main effects of MPRs (see both cases where 02  ) are that
parking spaces will be priced below the cost of providing them (for example
)(
),(),( mpr
u
mpr
u
u
mprmpr
uu Sh
N
ANB
N
SNC





) and total supply of parking will be above its market
determined equilibrium level ( *u
mpr
u NN  ).
Second, parking requirements may also cause serious problems in the office-commercial
floor space market. When MPRs bind ( 02  ), the excess underground parking results in a
deficit for the developer of a new building. This induced deficit constitutes an indirect tax on
building square footage ( 0)(2 


S
Sh
N
L mpr
mpr
u
 ). As a result, this creates a disincentive to high-
density development ( mprSS * ) because it imposes an extra wedge between the marginal
revenue gain from additional building square footage (
S
ShAqNB
mpr
mpr
u

 )(),,( ) and the marginal
construction costs (
S
SNC
p uuk



)ˆ,(
). Since the marginal cost of providing more parking spaces
at a site usually increases dramatically for underground structures
( 0
),(
2
2



u
uu
N
SNC
, 0),(
2



SN
SNC
u
uu ), this parking tax is also higher for larger buildings.
unit of land could be increased substantially by relaxing the constraint. In contrast, a low value of i
indicates that there is not much to be gained by relaxing the constraint. When 0i , the constraint is not
binding.
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Finally, FAR restrictions also constitute a tax on building square footage which leads to
building heights smaller than those in unconstrained markets ( FARSS * ). Based on current
construction costs, a developer might want to build a taller structure than allowed by density
controls and provide the requisite parking in order to maximize returns, even in the absence of
parking requirements ( 01  , 02  ).
Minimum parking requirements may nevertheless drive the total square footage allowed and
potentially inhibit density below what the FAR limit permits, in particular when the amount of
parking is constrained due to site geometry (size and shape) and site topography (slopes and poor
soil conditions). Site geometry and site topology may make the required parking not physically fit
on to a site and increase substantially parking costs and thus, 2 . In this situation S
ShFAR

 )ˆ(
1
may be smaller than
S
Sh
N
L mpr
mpr
u
mpr

 )(2 and thus, mprSS ˆ . However, in areas with stringent
limits on building height and where parking can feasibly be provided underground, parking
requirements may not be the greatest constraint on densities. When both regulatory restrictions
bind ( 01  , 02  ) they reinforce each other and it may be the case that the FAR limit pushes
densities further down than MPR.
Our results thus show that minimum parking requirements have counterproductive results in
downtown areas because they try to solve a problem in the transportation market that is only
indirectly related to the office-commercial floor space market. Because minimum parking
requirements increase the costs of new development, these minimum standards tend to decrease
the potential office-commercial density of new projects which is counter the objective of most
cities to promote downtown density to increase agglomeration economies and control for urban
sprawl. In addition, minimum parking requirements may also counteract other local policies
designed to encourage development in areas easily accessible by public transit as well as
compromise the feasibility of mass-transit investments in certain downtown areas.
2.4. Suburban Areas
The developer’s problem in the suburbs is to choose the level of structural density and
number of surface parking spaces that maximizes his profits per unit of land covered taking into
account the FAR restriction and Minimum Parking Requirements (MPRs):
13
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(13)
Since the capital-to-land ratio tends to decrease with distance from a CBD, it follows that a
FAR restriction will bind in the central part of a city, where the capital-to-land ratio would
normally be high, being nonbinding farther from the center. Thus, we focus our discussion on the
cases where only the MPR restriction is binding. The Kuhn-Tucker conditions for an interior
solution for problem (13) when the FAR restriction is not binding are presented in Table 2.
Again, 1 represents the shadow price associated with the FAR constraint and 2 is the shadow
price associated with the MPR constraint. All first order conditions are evaluated at the optimum.
For full details see Appendix A.
Upon examining Table 2, it is clear that whenever private decisions do not take into account
the externalities associated with impervious surface, too much surface parking is provided in the
suburbs even in the absence of MPR. The socially optimal number of surface parking spaces
maximizes
L
leN s
s  , where s are profits per unit of land covered. The first order condition for
the social optimal surface parking spaces, osN , is given by:
L
Kplep
Sh
N
ANB kl
s
s 


 )(
)(
),(
(14)
Comparing (14) and the first order condition in absence of regulatory constraints ( 01 
and 02  ) one notices that because of the negative externalities associated with impervious
surface, the social marginal cost of surface parking (
L
Kplep kl  )( ) is higher than the private
marginal cost (
L
Kplp kl  ). As a result, the socially efficient amount of land in surface parking
( osNl ) is less than the privately optimal amount ( *sNl ). Thus, if left to the market the supply of
surface parking is likely to be excessive.20 Not only are socially beneficial uses of surface parking
20 Government can encourage the social amount of both surface and underground parking through the imposition of a
Pigouvian tax, where the magnitude of the tax is set equal to the marginal external effect at the efficient allocation. This
would require imposition of a per unit tax on surface parking, where the magnitude of the tax is set equal to the dollar
value of the environmental external costs. Alternatively, the government can also set a maximum parking requirement
for surface parking, where the requirement would be equal to the social optimum.
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land foregone, but because land is paved, it also increases storm water runoff and has other
negative environmental impacts.
In the context of the monocentric city model, the spatial area of the city can be found by
adding total land in office-commercial use and total land in surface parking. Given that
*
sNl
o
sNl  the market equilibrium is characterized by inefficient spatial expansion of the urban
area, providing a basis also for criticism of urban sprawl.21
Like in downtown areas, MPRs also enforce an oversupply of parking in suburban areas
( *SmprS NN  ) which, intensifies the external costs associated with impervious surface coverage:
o
ss
mpr
s NleNleNle 
* . Because minimum parking requirements increase the cost of development,
densities are also lower in suburban areas compared to the unconstraint market outcome
( mprSS * ).
Note that in equilibrium, the shadow price associated with the MPRs satisfies:
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From (15) land uses that have higher parking requirements such as retail versus warehouses
and thus have a higher value of a , are expected to have also a higher shadow price, 2 .
2.5. Testable Hypothesis
The predicted theoretical relationships between marginal parking use value, marginal land
value, and marginal building area value give us the testable hypotheses for the empirical portion
of the paper. If MPRs do not bind, then the marginal value of parking should be equal to the
marginal value of additional land plus marginal parking construction costs. If the parking
constraints do bind, then the marginal parking use value should be less than the land value plus
construction costs. With proper data, we can thus estimate the shadow price associated with MPR
and make inferences about the underlying equilibrium. For example, in the case of surface
parking, the shadow price can be calculated with equation (15). Calculating the extensive margin
value of land is simple once we have the construction cost data and the parking requirements
data. However, the additional value of a property from adding an additional parking space cannot
be calculated explicitly. It must be inferred using hedonic regression techniques to estimate the
marginal contribution of each type of parking space to the price of the office-commercial
building.
21 Other causes of urban sprawl can be found in Brueckner (2000) and Bento et al. (2006).
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Our model also implies that the marginal revenue from additional building area should equal
marginal construction costs in the absence of binding parking requirements, but be greater than
marginal construction costs if parking constraints bind. We do not test this second hypothesis in
the present version of this paper, but may examine it in the future.
3. The Empirical Model
The empirical part of this paper focuses on the office-commercial-industrial property market
within suburban areas of Los Angeles and on surface parking lots. The suburban market was
chosen because, as our analytical results suggest, in downtown areas FAR restrictions are likely
to bind which in turn can influence development density and the amount of land allocated to
surface parking and parking density per acre.22 Moreover, surface parking in downtown LA also
results from a speculative decision process. Therefore, isolating the effect of MPR on the amount
of land allocated to parking in the central area of LA may be tricky. In further research we hope
to investigate the claims by critics that parking restrictions in fact prevent developers from
attaining the maximum FAR. In addition, our analytical results also suggest that surface parking
is more efficient if the price of land is relatively low. Given that land prices are typically lower in
the suburbs compared to downtown areas it is not surprising that most surface parking occurs in
the outskirts of the city.
We estimate the marginal values of parking and lot area with spatial and non-spatial methods
from Los Angeles area non-residential property sales. In order to simulate the marginal on-site
parking and parcel values we estimate a spatial error model for different land-use categories
because, as shown in section 5.1, average parking regulatory stringency differs by property type.23
3.1. Hedonic Price Model24
The bid-rent function given by (1) is the starting point for our hedonic price function
specification. This equation implies that office-commercial buildings can largely be considered as
bundles of attributes that cannot easily be repackaged to suit individual preferences. The
22 In some cases, zoning regulations include bonus programs that permit developers to exceed the base
maximum FAR if they include certain amenities such as affordable housing.
23 All spatial regressions were estimated using the Spatial Econometrics Package from James P. LeSage
(http://www.spatial-econometrics.com).
24 This section is largely similar to the same section in Cutter et al. (forthcoming).
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attributes typically evaluated by buyers in the housing market include not only structural
characteristics of the properties, but also neighborhood attributes linked to the properties.25
We use specifications of the following form in our hedonic price regression:
LPit  0   j LXijt   j Dij
j1
J

j1
J
   tYt
t1
T
  i (16)
In (16) itLP represents the log of the sale price of property i at time t , 20051997 t . ijtX is
a vector containing j continuous property characteristics of property i in time t , and jiD , are j
binary property characteristics of property i .26 tY is a dummy variable indicating the year the
property was last sold. 0 is the intercept regression coefficient and j , j and t represent the
regression coefficients associated with the explanatory variables. The error term is i , and it is
assumed to be normally distributed with constant variance. Note that our logarithmic form is an
approximation to the nonlinearities usually involved in the solution of models such as the one
presented in section 2.
3.2. Spatial Error Models
Spatial econometric techniques are now common in estimating the determinants of property
prices because of the likelihood of unobserved spatial relationships. This is because nearby
properties are likely to have similar unobservable characteristics (Bell and Bockstael (2000),
Ihlanfeldt and Taylor (2004)). As a result, inference based on t-statistics will be misleading. The
spatial econometric literature has focused on two different types of spatial dependence:
correlation and spatial lag (LeSage, (1999)). Thus, we first estimate the joint spatial model that
accounts for both types of spatial dependence:
  W1 LP  W2e u (17)
where  measures the degree of spatial autocorrelation, 1W is a nearest-neighbor spatial
weighting matrix, LP is the vector of property prices,  is a scalar measuring the degree of spatial
correlation, 2W is an inverse-distance weighting matrix, and e and u are i.i.d disturbances. If  is
significant, then the non-spatial estimate will generally be biased. Therefore, it is important to test
25 Neighborhood attributes may include physical characteristics of the neighborhood, the socio-economic
characteristics of the local residents, public service provisions, and environmental amenities.
26 The log transformation of the continuous property characteristics is consistent with past hedonic
literature on housing and commercial/retail/industrial properties (Hodgson et al. (2006)). In addition, Cutter
et al. (forthcoming) shows that this specification is superior for a similar data set.
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for spatial autocorrelation. Not accounting for spatial correlation does not bias coefficients, but
does result in inefficient estimation.
3.3. Simulation Methodology
We use property-by-property simulation to calculate the marginal square foot values for on-
site parking, building floor area, and parcel area. The estimated hedonic equation is non-linear
and each property is at a different location on the hedonic surface. Therefore to estimate the
distribution of these marginal values we estimate the values for each property’s vector of
attributes using the procedure of Krinsky and Robb (1986). This procedure takes a large number
of draws from the distribution of the error terms and the joint distribution of the coefficients.
We begin by taking random draws  from a multivariate normal distribution with variance-
covariance matrix Tˆ and mean ˆ :
)ˆ,ˆ(~ TN  (18)
We also draw a vector from the idiosyncratic error distribution:
u ~ N (0, 2In ) (19)
The observation error draw is generated by the following equation:
  (In  ˆW2 )
1
 (20)
And a predicted sale price vector is estimated using this draw:
Pi   exp(X  i ) (21)
where, iP is the predicted price,
1
1
ˆ
n
i
i
n 

  is the “smearing” adjustment for transforming the
log price prediction into a consistent linear price estimate, and X  [Ln(x) Y D] are the
observed independent variables.
Next, we calculate a new matrix of independent variables based on adding a small area
(denoted ) to either on-site parking or parcel area and we recalculate our variables, including
any interaction terms. This results in a new independent variable matrix, X . Then, we calculate a
new predicted price based on X ,  and  :
)~exp( ii XP   (22)
Once we have (22), we calculate a vector of the price difference per change in area  for
each property:
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Finally, we repeat this procedure with 1,000 draws from the distributions of  and  and
take the average over each iD vectors as the mean marginal value for the change in area for
property i . We use this procedure to approximate the mean and distribution of marginal values for
parcel area and on-site parking area.
4. Minimum Parking Requirements, Data and Variables
4.1. Minimum Parking Requirements
The minimum parking requirements for cities in the Los Angeles area are Byzantine in their
complexity.27 Parking requirements can differ significantly across property types that would
seem similar to the uninitiated. The basis also can differ. Many requirements are expressed as
numbers of parking spaces per square foot of gross building floor area, but other depend on
adjusted gross area, number of employees, number of seats in a restaurant, and other more
complex ratios. In addition, cities often have different zones where different parking
requirements apply. For all these reasons, a direct approach to estimating the effect of parking
minimums on the amount of parking space, such as regressing parking area on the parking
minimum and controls, faces serious obstacles because it would be very difficult to know which
set of parking minimums apply to a property. This is the main reason we propose the indirect
approach in this paper.
However, it is still useful to compare the results in the latter portion of this paper to a
summary measure of parking requirements. Shoup (2005) states that many municipalities rely on
the Institute of Transportation Engineers (ITE) parking generation rate studies, and in particular
their maximum generation rate, to set minimum parking standards. We grouped their average
generation rates from the ITE (1985) survey into the property use categories we use in this paper
(to the degree possible) and took the average maximum parking generation rate, by category. The
property categories, in order, were: service retail (restaurants, service stations) at 22.5 parking
spaces per day per 1000 square feet of building area; shopping retail (shopping centers) at 3.85;
offices at 3.425; general retail at 2.93, and; industrial at 1.80.
27 For instance, the Santa Monica requirement for health clubs is “1 space per 80 sq. ft. of exercise area, 1
space per each 300 sq. ft. of locker room/sauna/ shower area, plus applicable code requirement for other
uses.”
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4.2. Data Sets
Parcel-level data on non-residential property sales from 1996 through 2005 over a significant
portion of Los Angeles County was obtained through Costar Group, a national commercial real
estate information provider (www.costar.com). We removed several types of parcels28 not
suitable for the analysis and data with missing variables. In addition, we removed parcels whose
characteristics indicated that they contained parking structures, including any parcels where
building and parking area combined amounted to more than 110% of parcel space and any parcels
where the property notes indicated underground parking or a parking structure. The remaining
data fit the definition of suburban properties given in the analytical section. This means that our
data may understate the impact of parking regulations because we do not include properties in
denser areas where the shadow cost of parking restrictions may be higher.
The database contains the sales price of each property and a vector of structural
characteristics (such as building square footage, parking lot spaces, and property code) and a
vector of location characteristics (such as zip code, geographic zone, latitude, and longitude). We
joined this data to information on median residential sale price by zip code for the years covered
by the property sales. In order to put our parking space measure in the same units (square feet) as
our other property area characteristics, we use an estimate of 350 square feet per space from a
local parking expert (personal communication, Willson, 4/06/06), which includes all lanes,
medians, etc., that accompany spaces.29 For robustness we also use a value of 300 square feet per
space as a lower end estimate and re-estimate all specifications and simulations with that value
(we do not use an upper end value because that would only strengthen the conclusions of the
paper).
The initial database assigned each observation as one of three general land use types:
industrial, office or retail. We divided the large number of retail properties into service,
shopping, and general retail which resulted in five broad property categories (see Table 3).30 We
used Los Angeles County local roll parcel data that contains the information on every parcel
28 Parking, public facilities, residential, heavy industrial, industrial park, pleasure retail, retail-residential,
retail-office, hi-rise-office. We removed categories where there were few observations and where it was
not clear how to group them with other categories. Also, we dropped observations from 1996 because there
were few observations.
29 The data does not allow us to test whether it is parking area or the number of parking spaces that is
valued by the market. The linear transformation does not relax this constraint. By transforming the
parking space variables, the regressions are using units of 1/350th of a parking space, which is
approximately equal to one square foot.
30 Light industrial and industrial were combined into industrial and office-residential, office-industrial and
lo-rise office into the office category. Dummy variables for these subcategories are included in all
specifications.
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within Los Angeles County with GIS location information to generate the variables used to proxy
for off-site parking availability. We first matched the property sales data set to parcels in the Los
Angeles County local roll data, and then used GIS techniques to identify all other parcels within a
given radius of each sold parcel.
4.3. The variables
The control variables ijtX entering equation (16) are extensive. A complete listing of the
variables and their definitions are available in Table 4. Summary statistics for key variables are
presented by major land-use category in Table 5. The variables generally fall into two categories:
property characteristics and neighborhood characteristics. Briefly, our property characteristics
include property area (pcsqft), parking area (park), total building floor area (bldg), and building
age (age). All size measurements are in square feet. We expect the first three variables to have a
positive marginal effect on the sale price, and building age to have a negative marginal effect.
In addition, because demand for parking may increase with building floor area, we include an
interaction term between parking and building size, parkbldg.31 We expect this interaction term
to have a positive coefficient as a larger building may have a higher demand and value for
parking.32 With the interaction terms the marginal value of parking or total building floor area
can only be calculated by taking both coefficients into account.
Also, we control for nearby parking (one-third mile radius as well) in publicly-available lots
(pkgarg) and nearby parking in private, not publicly available, lots (pksup) because the value of
on-site parking may be affected by the proximity off-site parking.33 We expect the coefficients on
these variables to be positive as prices should be higher in denser areas and also higher where
there is more nearby parking.
Finally, we roughly proxy for underlying land values by including the median house price in
the zip code of the property (logDQprice) and total building floor area per square foot land area
in a one-third mile radius (ldens). We expect the coefficients to be positive.
31 This interaction is log(park)*log(bldg).
32 We also use dummy variables for year, property type, for four general geographic categories (Southwest
Los Angeles, West San Fernando, San Gabriel, East San Fernando) and, following Ihlanfeldt and Taylor
(2004), we also include a number of building construction and condition categories (see Table 4 for the
categories). The full set of regression results is available on request from the authors.
33 A review of walking distance literature (NJtransit (1994)) finds that most studies show that maximum
walking distances are between .25 to .5 miles, with more studies in the .25 range. Therefore we chose one-
third of mile as an approximation of walking distance. We also ran the same specifications with a .5 mile
radius for ldens, pkgarg, pksup and found similar parameter values.
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5. Parking Regulation Tests
Parking Regulation Direct Test
For some properties we collected data on current parking requirement and examined directly
whether parking requirements appear to be binding. If buildings have the required amount of
parking space that suggests the requirement is binding, if they have more parking spaces that
suggests the parking requirement does not bind.
Office properties were the only category where we could gather consistent data across cities.
Other property types either do not have consistent property categories across cities or have
parking requirements that are based on property attributes we do not have data on (seats in a
restaurant, for instance). This office dataset is different than the office category in the hedonic
regressions because, since we are directly testing whether parking regulation binds, we could
examine all office properties. For each of the properties we calculated the number of required
parking spaces from the city regulations for thirteen cities with straightforward office parking
requirements.34
This direct test is suggestive but not definitive for several reasons. First, parking requirements
may have been different when the buildings were constructed. Second, zoning classifications for
properties can change over time. And third, the office classification in the CoStar data may not
correspond with the cities’ zoning classification.
Keeping these limitations in mind, we examine the ratio of parking spaces to required spaces.
If parking requirements are well enforced, the ratio should not be significantly less than one,
though if the costs are as high as the hedonic estimates suggest, then developers will seek and
obtain some variances from the parking regulation.35 If parking requirements bind, the ratio
should be equal to one, and if they do not bind the ratio should be greater than one. We examine a
null hypothesis that the ratio of actual to required parking space is equal to one versus the
alternative that the ratio is greater than one.
Parking Regulation Indirect Test
Equation (15) in the analytic model outlines the basic framework for the indirect test of
parking requirements. It is likely that for some properties MPR’s bind and the marginal value of
34 Unfortunately the Los Angeles City requirements are not straightforward and office properties in the city
could not be included.
35 A variance is permission from the city government to depart from the normally applicable building or
zoning codes.
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additional parking spaces is less than the marginal cost of a parking space, but for other parcels
MPRs do not bind:
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Properties are likely to differ in both their parking requirements and their marginal value of
parking. Our estimate of the marginal value of parking and land comes from equation (23). The
marginal cost of asphalt paving is around 2.50 a square foot in 2006.36
6. Empirical Results
The estimation results are presented in tables 6 and 7 and are briefly discussed below.
Hedonic Price Models
Equation (16) is estimated using sale prices over the period 1997-2005. The length of this
period provided a reasonable number of sales for each of the five land-use categories: industrial
facilities, service retail buildings, shopping retail buildings, general retail buildings and office
buildings. Therefore, we estimated specifications of each property category individually and an
overall pooled model.
We estimated models with spatial correlation, spatial correlation and lag terms, and then with
spatial correlation and heteroskedasticity. The spatial lag coefficient was insignificant and small
in all specifications and the estimated coefficients were similar to the models with spatial
correlation alone. We also employed a Bayesian approach for allowing heteroskedasticity
(LeSage (1999)). There is evidence of significant heteroskedasticity, but these specifications
have very similar coefficients and standard errors to the specifications with spatial correlation
alone. Because the spatial correlation control appears to generate similar results as the other
spatial models we tested and is less complicated, we present the spatial correlation results. Table
6 reports the coefficient estimates. In addition, the table shows the values of the various test
statistics and their corresponding z-values values in parenthesis.
36 Personal communication with Andy Youngs, California-Nevada Cement Council, 7/06/07.
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The high adjusted- 2R value (i.e. 0.83) is a favorable result for the model. The office, general
retail and industrial equations each explain over 79% of the variation in sales prices within each
of their respective categories.
The marginal effects of the property attributes are of the expected sign and generally highly
significant in the pooled model (all property types). Sales prices are higher for buildings with
greater property area. The coefficient on property area (lpcsqft) is positive and significant at the
1% level. The coefficient on age (lage) is negative and significant at the 1%, as expected. This
robust negative effect of age suggests that newness, reflecting quality, is a characteristic also
valued in the non-residential market. The coefficients on each of the nearby parking measures
(lpksup and lpkgarg) are significant as expected and positive at the 1% level. Also, the
coefficient on lDQprice is significant and positive at the 1% level, again as expected. Finally, the
ldens coefficient is positive and significant at the 1% level, indicating that, as expected, denser
areas have higher property prices. The coefficients are generally consistent across the individual
property-type regressions.
The coefficients on logpark, logbldg, and logparkxlogbldg need to be understood jointly
since we are interested in the marginal effect of parking and building, and not so much the
individual coefficients. The coefficients on logpark and logbldg are each negative and significant
at the 1% level. However, the marginal effect of parking area and building area are positive over
the range of the data because the interaction term logparkxlogbldg has a positive coefficient
(significant at the 1% level). It is key to include this interaction term because the analytical
section predicts that parking should have a higher marginal value the larger the building floor
area, ceteris paribus, and the positive coefficient on the interaction term supports this hypothesis.
Parking Regulation Direct Test
For the overall sample the mean ratio of actual to required spaces is .97, indicating that
building usually have slightly less parking than required. The 95% confidence interval is [.92, 1].
This is evidence that developers are not building more than the required spaces. However, it does
seem curious that they are building less than the required spaces. Shoup (2005) notes that
parking regulations spread widely after WWII, so it is possible that the low ratio reflects legacy
buildings. Also, more recent buildings are more likely to be under current parking regulations.
Therefore, we looked at buildings less than 30 years old. This sub-sample has a ratio of .97 with
a 95% confidence interval of [.93, 1.0]. This seems consistent with a binding parking
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requirement.37 However, the limited dataset and the various problems with matching current
parking requirements to older properties make these results suggestive rather than definitive.
Parking Regulation Indirect Test
Table 7 presents the results for our indirect test. The results suggest that parking requirements
are binding for the majority of properties in all of the property classes. We define MPRs as
binding for a given property when the estimated value of the left-hand-side (LHS) of Equation
(24) is significantly greater than the right-hand-side (RHS) of Equation (24) at the 5% level (two-
sided). For all properties (row 1) approximately 88% of properties appear to have binding MPRs.
However, this masks significant variation. Industrial properties are estimated to have binding
MPRs in about 80% of the cases, while service retail properties have binding MPRs for 99% of
the properties.
The scale of the social loss from MPRs is related to the difference between the RHS and LHS
of Equation (24), not just whether MPRs bind. The mismatch between the costs and the marginal
willingness to pay for parking area suggests that too many resources are being allocated towards
the construction of parking spaces. The last two columns of Table 7 give a sense of this
mismatch. For all properties, parcel area plus construction costs are approximately $20/ ft2 more
than the value of parking area. Again, there is significant variation in this difference across
property types. For service retail, parcel area is worth approximately $47/ft2 more than parking
space area. This suggests that the social loss from MPRs in the service retail category is quite
large (per area). In contrast, for industrial areas, parcel area is only worth approximately $5/ ft2
more than parking space area, which implies that MPRs have comparatively low social cost per
area for industrial properties. Our results, thus suggest that reducing parking standards for general
retail, service retail and office uses will be a successful strategy in encouraging new development
to provide fewer parking space on average. In contrast, a strategy will be less successful for
shopping retail and industrial uses, which seem to either have lower standards relative to demand
or be less sensitive to minimum parking standards.38
The estimated mean marginal land values used to calculate parking costs are somewhat lower
than the per square foot land values in the Los Angeles area for vacant land. An analysis (Cutter
37 However, many buildings have many fewer than the required number of spaces in current regulation.
The 25th percentile of actual to required spaces is .72, so 25% of properties have less than 72% of the
required spaces. This could either be the result of not having the exact parking requirements at the time of
construction or widespread variances allowing less than the MPR. Investigating this anomaly is beyond the
scope of the current paper but should be a subject for future research.
38 For instance big shopping retail tends to want a lot of spaces to deal with the Christmas Rush.
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(2008)) shows the value of vacant land zone industrial averaged $38 ft2 and vacant land zoned
commercial averaged $98/ ft2. Because vacant land may not be representative of land values
overall, we do not expect the marginal value of land to exactly equal the value of vacant land.
However, the analysis of vacant land prices suggests that our land values are conservative and
therefore our indirect test of whether MPRs bind is conservative.39
If minimum parking requirements force developers to supply parking beyond what the market
is willing to pay for, then profit-maximizing developers will try to mitigate the negative effect
from parking provisions on profits by economizing for example in space with more compact
spots, narrower aisles, and other measures to minimize paved area. In this setting, the 350 ft2
parking size estimate would be too large for some property types. Therefore, we have also re-
estimated the models and simulations using a 300 ft2 estimate to test the robustness of the results.
This is a low-end estimate of the total area per parking space that could be achieved with Los
Angeles area parking regulations. In general, the difference between the total parking costs and
parking values narrows but not substantially. The estimated percentage of properties where the
MPRs bind fall by three percentage points to 85 percent for all properties. Even in this very low
parking space size scenario it appears that MPRs bind for a large majority of properties.
Discussion
The statistical results are consistent with parking constraints having a strong effect on land-
use decision. It appears that in some property categories, such as service and general retail,
individual properties are placing quite a bit more than the profit-maximizing amount of parking.
It is nevertheless beyond the scope of this paper to estimate the effect of MPRs on the overall
commercial property and parking equilibriums.
The ranking of the marginal value differences is similar to the ranking of the ITE (1985)
maximum parking generation rates by property category we discussed in Section 4. The ITE
(1985) maximum parking generation rate with by far the highest average value (service retail) is
also the property category with the lowest marking parking use value and the greatest difference.
This is evidence that the differences in marginal values are related to MPRs.
39 One curious result from these regressions is the negative marginal value accorded to parking area in the
service retail category. A negative marginal value is plausible if the MPRs are so high that additional
parking area adds no value to the lot and there are significant expenses for cleaning, maintenance, and
occasional replacement of the parking lot. The negative $8.69/ ft2 marginal value could be accounted for
by a maintenance and upkeep cost of $.77/ ft2 per year. This is plausible since asphalt must be replaced
every 10-15 years at a cost of $2-$3/ ft2, and also needs periodic maintenance and cleaning.
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We can also test our finding by comparing the direct and indirect tests of whether MPRs bind for
office properties. Our direct measure finds that about 72 % of properties are at or below the
current MPR for their city. The indirect measure estimates that between 78% and 83% of office
properties have binding MPRs. The sample for the direct test is slightly different and includes
more properties in built out areas where MPRs are likely binding. However, the comparison
suggests that the results reinforce each other. Thus, if the goal of minimum parking requirements
is to prevent parking spillover and traffic congestion associated with cruising for on-street
parking, our results suggest that MPRs are a blunt and inefficient form of parking management.
Other forms of parking pricing that accounts for social externalities can be a superior parking
management (Small (1992), Shoup (2004, 2005), Arnott et al. (2005)). For example, Arnott et al.
(2005) show that an efficient on-street parking pricing scheme can produce travel time savings
from reducing traffic congestion and wasteful cruising-for-parking activity and at the same time
raise government revenues which can be used to reduce distortionary taxation.40
7. Conclusion
Minimum parking regulation is a pervasive feature of United States land-use practices.
Davidson and Dolnick (2002) state that parking planning questions are among the top five queries
for the American planning service each year. Authors such as Shoup (1999) and Davidson and
Dolnick (2002) have suggested that parking regulation forces developers to place far more
parking spots than necessary on their lot. Arnold and Gibbons (1996) detail the destructive
environmental effects of excessive impermeable surfaces. Shoup (1999) also suggest that parking
regulations may have a dynamic effect where the design requirements of large parking areas
render new development pedestrian unfriendly so that more individuals are forced to travel by
car.
However, to our knowledge, the evidence that parking requirements increase the amount of
parking spaces built is limited to a few case studies. This paper seeks to remedy that by
examining whether there is evidence of a parking regulation effect for sold properties in Los
40 Arnott et al. (2005) also emphasize the need to examine policies that might complement congestion
pricing, such as appropriately pricing freight and mass transit; staggering work hours for government
employees; encouraging biking and walking; and improving the design of roads and intersections to
improve traffic flow. Small (1992) discusses the design of a package of congestion charges and revenue
uses that may be more politically feasible and thus, look attractive to most people. The author also
discusses the potential amounts and uses of money raised by congestion pricing on all congested freeways
and arterials in the five-county Los Angeles region. His numerical calculations of the effects of this
package on various individuals confirm that such a package can create net benefits for a wide spectrum of
individuals and interest groups.
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Angeles. A simple theoretical model of optimal development of a parcel implies that the
marginal value of parking should be less (equal) to the marginal value of land for a parcel plus the
construction cost of parking in the presence (absence) of binding minimum parking regulations.
We test this proposition for a multi-year dataset of sales and for six different property types using
a spatial error model. We find that for the majority of properties a null hypothesis of equality
between marginal parking and marginal land plus construction costs is rejected at a 5%
significance level. This supports the idea that minimum parking requirements significantly affect
the amount of parking on a parcel. A direct comparison of required and actual parking spaces for
a subset of office properties where we could obtain approximate parking requirements also
indicates that parking requirements bind for a majority of properties.
The magnitudes of the differences in the marginal quantities suggest that parking minimum
requirements have large effects on the distribution of parcel space between various uses. Further
research should examine the quantitative impact of parking minimums on the aggregate amount
of parking and impervious space.
This research provides further evidence for the arguments of Shoup (1999) and Willson
(1995) that parking minimums significantly distort land-use decisions. In addition, the evidence
that, in some cases, parking use value is a small fraction of parcel land value suggests that the
efficiency losses from parking minimums may be quite large. However, a full consideration of
the optimal level of off-street parking would have to consider the congestion externalities due to
lower requirements as well as the environmental benefits of less parking.
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Appendix
Table 1: Kuhn-Tucker conditions for problem (12)
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Table 2: Kuhn-Tucker conditions for problem (13)
01 
02 
kS pS
ShAqNB 

 )(),,(
*
*
L
Kplp
Sh
N
AqNB kl
S
S 



)(
),,( *
*
02 
S
Sh
N
p
S
ShAqNB
mpr
mpr
S
mpr
k
mpr
mpr
S




 )()(),,( 2

22 )(
)()(
),,(
mpr
S
mpr
mprklmpr
S
mpr
S
N
Sh
L
Kplp
Sh
N
AqNB





)( mprmprS SahN 
Table 3: Property Type Summary.
Property Code Obs(1997-2005)
Industrial 3,636
Service retail 1,547
Shopping retail 996
General Retail 1,101
Office 1,999
Total 9,279
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Table 4: Variable Definitions
Variable name Definition
Dependent Variable
lprice Log of sale price
Neighborhood Characteristics
pkgarg Area in publicly accessible parking - one-third mile radius (square feet)
pksup Area in private parking per square foot land area - one-third mile radius
(square feet)
dens Total non-residential building floor area per square foot land area - one-third
mile radius.
DQprice Median house value in zip code and year of sale.
Property Characteristics
pcsqft Property area (square feet)
park Parking area (square feet)
bldg Building floor area (square feet)
age Age of main building on property
cnloc Corner location
Construction indicators Categories are: concrete (dropped), brick, frame, mixed, other, missing
Condition indicators Condition categories: A (dropped),E,F,G,P, missing.
Property categories indicators for industrial (dropped), three retail types and office, for pooled
specification only
Year dummies Indicators for each year of sale (year1997-year2005)
Area dummies Indicators for Southwest Los Angeles (dropped), West and East San Fernando
Valley, and San Gabriel Valley
ltind Indicator for light industrial (industrial property specification only)
looff Low rise office indicator (office properties specification only)
offres Office-residential dual use indicator (office properties specification only)
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Table 5: Summary Statistics
Variable name Mean Max Min Sd N
price 1,268,376 22,900,000 25,000 1,334,679 9279
pkgarg 176,470 4,291,031 0.00 228,832 9,279
pksup 0.75 7.80 0.25 0.41 9,279
dens 0.13 1.50 0.00 0.12 9,279
DQprice 282,155 2,950,000 41,500 163,276 9,279
pcsqft 29,970 152,896 2,161 27,713 9,279
park 9,536 115,500 350 10,590 9,279
bldg 12,893 207,745 98 14,350 9,279
age 37.00 176.00 1.00 19.86 9,279
cnloc 0.371 1 0 0.483 9,279
ltind 0.008 1 0 0.087 3,636
looff 0.680 1 0 0.466 1,999
offres 0.054 1 0 0.226 1,999
Construction indicators
concrete 0.449 1 0 0.497 9,279
brick 0.120 1 0 0.325 9,279
frame 0.322 1 0 0.467 9,279
mixed 0.055 1 0 0.228 9,279
other 0.035 1 0 0.184 9,279
missing 0.018 1 0 0.134 9,279
Condition indicators
A 0.449 1 0 0.497 9,279
E 0.120 1 0 0.325 9,279
F 0.322 1 0 0.467 9,279
G 0.055 1 0 0.228 9,279
P 0.035 1 0 0.184 9,279
missing 0.018 1 0 0.134 9,279
Area dummies
Southwest Los Angeles 0.607 1 0 0.489 9,279
West San Fernando 0.085 1 0 0.278 9,279
San Gabriel 0.289 1 0 0.453 9,279
East San Fernando 0.020 1 0 0.140 9,279
* Before any variable transformation or rescaling.
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Table 6: Spatial Error Regressions, Pooled and by Property Code.
All Properties Industrial Service retail Shopping retail General retail Office
Dependent Variable: Log (Sale Price)
Adj R2 0.83 0.88 0.70 0.81 0.79 0.87
Variable Definition
lpkgarg log(pkgarg) 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.06 0.01 0.01
(4.63)*** (3.37)*** (1.03) (2.45)** (0.66) (0.85)
lpksup log(pksup) 0.07 0.08 0.10 0.01 0.14 0.06
(4.08)*** (3.24)*** (2.15)** (0.17) (2.63)*** (1.63)
ldens log(dens) 0.31 0.25 0.35 0.23 0.39 0.32
(17.08)*** (10)*** (7.87)*** (4.08)*** (8.47)*** (9.27)***
lpcsqft log(pcsqft) 0.40 0.35 0.53 0.34 0.35 0.25
(40.36)*** (26.27)*** (19.75)*** (8.01)*** (11.06)*** (11.24)***
logpark log(park) -0.52 -0.30 -0.24 -0.18 -0.81 -0.73
(28.68)*** (16.01)*** (6.08)*** (4.36)*** (10.87)*** (16.36)***
logbldg log(bldg) -0.23 0.06 -0.05 0.12 -0.55 -0.33
(13.91)*** (3.67)*** (1.43) (3.43)*** (7.52)*** (7.76)***
lage log(age) -0.14 -0.10 -0.14 -0.17 -0.14 -0.13
(24.21)*** (12.94)*** (8.75)*** (9.52)*** (8.26)*** (9.06)***
logDQprice log(DQprice) 0.41 0.33 0.43 0.39 0.55 0.38
(28.91)*** (15.69)*** (12.06)*** (8.92)*** (15.55)*** (14.77)***
logparkxlogbldg log(park)*log(bldg) 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.10 0.09
(33.18)*** (19.78)*** (5.18)*** (6.79)*** (12.25)*** (19.61)***
Constant 6.96 5.64 4.65 4.09 8.82 9.97
(58.73)*** (28.39)*** (7.57)*** (6.02)*** (24.63)*** (77.45)***
Rho (spatial correlation) 0.52 0.56 0.34 0.45 0.46 0.53
(122.4)*** (89.2)*** (26.41)*** (36.2)*** (33.41)*** (53.18)***
Observations 9,279 3,636 1,547 996 1,101 1,999
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses.
*** Significant at 1% ** Significant at 5% * Significant at 1%
a The controls not listed are: year dummies, region dummies, building material dummies,
building condition dummies, corner location dummy, light industrial dummy, and low rise office dummy.
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Table 7: Parking Value Appears Less than Parking Cost for Many Properties.
Percent of Properties
with Binding MPRs*
Average Marginal
Parking Value
Average Marginal Parking Cost
(Land + Parking Construction**)
Difference (Column 5-
Column 4) N
Parking Space =350 Square Feet*** per square foot per square foot per square foot
All 88% 7.94 28.37 20.43 9,279
industrial 80% 12.28 16.99 4.72 3,636
service retail 99% -8.54 38.95 47.49 1,547
shopping retail 91% 19.18 29.11 9.93 996
retail 88% 8.53 33.08 24.55 1,101
office 84% 8.03 23.71 15.68 1,999
Parking Space =300 Square Feet****
All 85% 9.23 28.33 19.1 9,279
industrial 75% 14.33 16.97 2.64 3,636
service retail 99% -10.04 38.88 48.92 1,547
shopping retail 83% 22.95 28.73 5.77 996
retail 85% 9.13 33.42 24.29 1,101
office 78% 9.88 23.43 13.55 1,999
* Percentage of properties that reject parking value equals parking cost at a 5% significance level.
** Land cost is estimated from the hedonic model. Parking construction cost is placed at the cost of asphalt construction.
*** Each parking space is assumed to entail 350 square feet of parking surface, including all lanes and medians.
**** Each parking space is assumed to entail 300 square feet of parking surface, including all lanes and medians.
